Important Libel Cases

1. New York Times v. Sullivan: The single most important libel case. Nothing else even comes close to this case in importance. All other libel cases are descended from this one.

That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the  "breathing space"  that they  "need. . . to survive," . . .

A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions -- and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount -- leads to a comparable "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars. Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

2. St Amant v. Thompson: "Actual malice" is determined by what the defendant thought at the time he made the defamatory statement--not by what a reasonable person would have thought under the circumstances.

   These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant, in fact, entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. . . .

   Concededly the reckless disregard standard may permit recovery in fewer situations than would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or the prudent publisher. But New York Times and succeeding cases have emphasized that the stake of the people in public business and the conduct of public officials is so great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary care would protect against self-censorship, and thus adequately implement First Amendment policies. Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further proliferation. But to insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications, as well as true ones. . . .

   Failure to investigate does not, in itself, establish bad faith.

3. Curtis v. Butts : Extends the New York Times ruling to public figures as well as public officials.

To me, differentiation between "public figures" and "public officials" and adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy. Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are blurred. Since the depression of the 1930's and World War II, there has been a rapid fusion of economic and political power, a merging of science, industry, and government, and a high degree of interaction between the intellectual, governmental, and business worlds. Depression, war, international tensions, national and international markets, and the surging growth of science and technology have precipitated national and international problems that demand national and international solutions. While these trends and events have occasioned a consolidation of governmental power, power has also become much more organized in what we have commonly considered to be the private sector. In many situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are now originated and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with the Government. This blending of positions and power has also occurred in the case of individuals, so that many who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.

Viewed in this context, then, it is plain that, although they are not subject to the restraints of the political process, "public figures,"    like "public officials,"   often play an influential role in ordering society. And surely, as a class, these "public figures"   have as ready access as "public officials"   to mass media of communication, both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities.

4. Gertz v. Robert Welch : A private figure plaintiff must show fault (at least negligence) in order to win compensatory damages. She must show actual malice to win presumed damages and punitive damages.

   The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters. . . .

   Yet absolute protection for the communications media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of defamation.

   The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require the State to abandon this purpose . . .

   In our continuing effort to define the proper accommodation between these competing concerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space" essential to their fruitful exercise. To that end, this Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood.

   Plainly, many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test.

   The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help -- using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error, and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication, and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy .Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater. . . .

   For the most part, those who attain this status [of public figure] have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes . More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.

   Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them.  No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public office or assumed an "influential role in ordering society."  He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery. . . .

   We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.

   . . . this countervailing state interest extends no further than compensation for actual injury. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.

   ...the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion, rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact. . . .

   It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury. . . .

   . . . jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions.

   In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.

5. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders: This case narrows the protections provided to a defendant in private plaintiff lawsuits involving speech that is not a matter of public concern. Such a plaintiff does not have to show actual malice to be awarded presumed and punitive damages when the defamation does not involve a matter of public concern.

Unresolved: Can a state pass a law holding a defendant liable without fault if he makes a defamatory statement about a private plaintiff involving a matter that is of only private concern? Can presumed and punitive damages be awarded to such a plaintiff without fault? The answer is presumably "yes" to both questions.

In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages - even absent a showing of "actual malice."

We conclude that permitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases absent a showing of "  actual malice"   does not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern.

Dun & Bradstreet hinted that the Court would extend Constitutional protections to both media and non-media defendants. However, Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. made it clear that this issue was unresolved.

6. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps: In a case involving the media reporting on matters of public concern, a private figure plaintiff must prove that the defamatory article was false before he can recover damages for libel.

   ...as one might expect given the language of the Court in New York Times, a public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of the statements at issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation.

   Here, as in Gertz, the plaintiff is a private figure and the newspaper articles are of public concern. In Gertz, as in New York Times, the common-law rule was superseded by a constitutional rule. We believe that the common law's rule on falsity--that the defendant must bear the burden of proving truth--must similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages. . . .

   In a case presenting a configuration of speech and plaintiff like the one we face here, and where the scales are in such an uncertain balance, we believe that the Constitution requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true speech. To ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred, we hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern.

   . . . placement by state law of the burden of proving truth upon media defendants who publish speech of public concern deters such speech because of the fear that liability will unjustifiably result. . . . Because such a "chilling" effect would be antithetical to the First Amendment's protection of true speech on matters of public concern, we believe that a private-figure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at issue is false before recovering damages for defamation from a media defendant. To do otherwise could "only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free."

7. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: The Court refused to carve out a special protection for opinions. It noted that decisions in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, and Letter Carriers v. Austin protected speech involving hyperbole. It then held that previous cases had already provided enough Constitutional protections for cases involving media defendants to protect First Amendment rights.

   Hepps ensures that a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection. . . .

   We are not persuaded that, in addition to these protections, an additional separate constitutional privilege for "  opinion"    is required to ensure the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.